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Abstract	  
	  
The	  World	  Trade	  Organization	  is	  a	  highly	  significant	  global	  body,	  acting	  as	  a	  permanent	  
forum	  for	  liberalization	  of	  trade	  in	  goods	  and	  services.	  It	  recently	  increased	  management	  of	  
global	  investment	  and	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  as	  well	  as	  agriculture.	  However	  its	  
growing	  global	  power,	  that	  historically	  made	  it	  the	  perfect	  case	  study	  for	  neoliberals	  to	  
illustrate	  the	  success	  of	  institutions	  in	  shaping	  international	  cooperation,	  is	  recently	  
subject	  to	  growing	  public	  scrutiny	  where	  people	  question	  its	  legitimacy	  and	  accountability.	  
The	  latest	  negotiation	  round,	  namely	  DDA	  (Doha	  Development	  Agenda)	  was	  launched	  in	  
2001	  with	  an	  official	  objective	  of	  improving	  trading	  prospects	  for	  developing	  countries.	  	  
After	  twelve	  years	  of	  negotiations	  not	  only	  has	  no	  agreement	  been	  reached	  but	  the	  content	  
of	  the	  round	  in	  terms	  of	  possible	  development	  perspectives	  for	  the	  global	  south	  has	  
significantly	  shifted.	  The	  goal	  of	  this	  research	  is	  to	  try	  to	  understand	  what	  are	  the	  forces	  
and	  factors	  behind	  the	  impediments	  of	  agriculture	  liberalization.	  Do	  the	  troubles	  with	  the	  
DDA	  possibly	  reflect	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  WTO	  efficiency	  as	  an	  institution	  in	  service	  of	  trade	  
liberalization?	  Or	  does	  agriculture	  simply	  not	  correspond	  with	  liberalization?	  After	  
analyzing	  respectively,	  neoliberal	  models,	  realist	  paradigms	  and	  critical	  theorist	  criticism	  
on	  the	  WTO,	  one	  can	  make	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  power	  politics	  inside	  the	  WTO	  is	  the	  driving	  
force	  behind	  agreements;	  and	  if	  an	  agreement	  is	  to	  be	  reached	  in	  the	  DDA	  it	  will	  most	  likely	  
represent	  an	  organized	  hypocrisy.	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The World Trade Organization is a very potent global body that serves as a permanent 
forum for the liberalization of trade in goods and services. It recently increased its participation 
in the management of global investment and intellectual property rights as well as trade of 
agriculture. It currently counts a membership of 146 states, with some 30 developing countries in 
transition eagerly waiting to join. Its members correspond to 90 percent of world trade and 
investment. However, its growing global power, that has historically made it the perfect case 
study for neoliberals wishing to illustrate the success of institutions in shaping international 
cooperation, has recently been the subject of intense and growing public scrutiny wherein critics 
and scholars have questioned its legitimacy and accountability. The WTO has experimented 
multiple setbacks, started with the Seattle debacle in 1999. The latest negotiation Round, namely 
the Doha Development Agenda, commonly referred to as DDA, was launched in 2001 with the 
mandate and official objective of improving trading prospects for developing countries.  After 
twelve arduous years of seemingly fruitless negotiations, not only has there been no agreement 
reached but the content of the round in terms of possible development prospects for the Global 
South has significantly shifted. Some critics see the failure of DDA as signaling major 
institutional flaws of the WTO, whereas others still believe that the WTO remains the most 
promising form of institutional cooperation. Whether or not the DDA represents the institutional 
limits of the WTO, the fact that the agreement is still so very problematic inevitably provokes 
some examination. 
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 The goal of this research is to try to understand what the forces and factors are behind 
the stalled the liberalization of trade in agriculture. To do so, we need to clarify multiple 
assumptions about the WTO. The first assumption this research is based on is to accept the 
principle that before any agreement is reached, the WTO is a forum of traditional international 
negotiation. Historically, the GATT and its successor the WTO have to come to a multilateral 
agreement for any WTO rule and implementation to be effective for members’ countries. Here I 
argue that before reaching that multilateral agreement that entails so much of the neoliberal 
argument1, the WTO is a regular community of countries, a platform of negotiation such as any 
other informal diplomacy arriving at consensus2 where countries advocate for their best interest. 
The institutional incentives created by WTO only and strictly apply to members who signed the 
agreement. As it is today, the WTO’s rules or the agreements are the result of negotiations 
between the members. The current agreements were the outcome of the 1986–94 Uruguay round 
negotiations which included an important revision of the original General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT). Goods, services and intellectual property are under the umbrella of the 
Uruguay round and under very specific rule and regulation. As for the agriculture, it is regulated 
today by the Agreement on Agriculture (hereafter referred to as the AoA). It was finalized during 
the Uruguay Round, and entered into force with the establishment of the WTO on January 1, 
1995. Therefore the current round DDA is before anything a platform for negotiation where the 
countries articulate their preferences to be represented in the final draft of the agreement. The 
starting point of this research inevitably takes the realistic assumption of the role played by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Neoliberals believe that institutions create incentive for international cooperation, moving 
cooperation from a PD dilemma to an iterated game where retaliation against non-cooperative 
behavior is possible. Robert O. Keohane. After Hegemony, cooperation and Discord in the 
World Political Economy. Princeton University Press, (1984,2005)  
2 Amrita Narlikar and Rorden Wilkinson, “Collapse at the WTO: a Cancun post-mortem”, Third 
World Quarterly, 2004, p448 
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power politics in the international arena. The second assumption of this research is based on the 
commonly known argument of rationality. Both realists and neoliberals assume there is a 
particular rationality possessed of international actors. Here we assume that countries engaged in 
that process of negotiation at the DDA are rational actors trying to maximize their benefit. To 
say it differently before reaching an agreement, WTO negotiation resembles an arena where 
countries bargain what will be put in the agreement according to their individual country 
preferences. The last assumption is based on the fact that we need to recognize and accept that 
the WTO as an organization has its own agenda, which is to promote trade liberalization. The 
Neoliberal perspective assumes a certain independence of institutions and in the case of the 
WTO there is multiples evidences that the organization is pursuing its own goal independently of 
countries national interest, therefore let us take its essence into consideration.  
We will attempt to ascertain as to whether the apparent troubles with the DDA are linked 
to and possibly reflect the limits of the WTO’s efficiency as an institution. Furthermore, I will 
examine the question into whether agriculture as a lone issue is simply a “no-go-subject” in as 
far as liberalization is concerned.  After analyzing neoliberal models, realist paradigms, and 
critical theorists perspectives on the WTO respectively, I then will purpose an the argument 
backing the hypothesis: Power politics inside the WTO are the driving forces behind agreements 
or the lack thereof; and consequently, if an agreement is to be reached at the DDA it will most 
likely represent sentiments of organized hypocrisy rather than a true equity.  
Here I refer to power politic in the sense described by structural realists. Their idea is that 
power is measured by material capability. According to Waltz, the political clout of nations 
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correlates closely with their economic power and their military might3. Here in our hypothesis 
we define power politics as that material capability from great powers to use their economic 
position to influence decision. According to Waltz, making a deal is difficult among states 
because of the concern with “relative gains”. Cooperation is hard because states worry that the 
other states will gain a bigger share of the pie and shift the balance of power in the other states 
favor4. With this consideration in mind I argue that power politics and not institutional incentives 
described by neoliberals such as Keohane is the driving force behind negotiation at the WTO. To 
do so, I will use the intensive development of the DDA this past twelve years as a case study as 
well as the concrete example of the Brazil’s cotton dispute case started in 2002.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, “International relations theories discipline and 
diversity”, (2013). P65 
4 Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, “International relations theories discipline and 
diversity”, (2013). P 82. Featured book, Kenneth Waltz, “Theory of international Politics”	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Chapter 1 : Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
 
I will present how the WTO reflects the neoliberal paradigm of cooperation and 
represents a perfect case study. Then, even if the realist perspective did not analyze the WTO 
specifically, and perceive with a certain irrelevance the role of institutions in international 
relation, I will nevertheless draw multiple implications from the realist perception. Finally I will 
present some criticisms of the WTO’s from a normative standpoint. After analyzing respectively 
these three perspectives of international theory, a few observations can be made. The realist 
perspective on the WTO helps open up the cracks of the neoliberal cooperation model. Classical 
realist such as Thucydides and Morgenthau give us insight into power politics through the 
community of identity and norms that are represented at WTO. Overall, the realist perspective on 
the WTO also helps to open the door for normative criticisms, which question more substantially 
the objectives and procedures of the WTO, to be taken seriously.  
 
I/ The Neoliberal case study champion 
The institutional evolution of the WTO serves as an excellent case study for illustrating the 
importance of institutional design for pursuing collective goals in an anarchic environment and 
has been the subject of considerable neoliberal analysis. States developed the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), in order to better obtain their collective economic interest. The 
WTO’s institutional design developed out of the collective experience with GATT.  The WTO is 
a formal inter-governmental organization with a full secretariat and an extensive institutional 
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structure designed to cover all aspects of trade (not simply tradable goods). It contained one of 
the most highly developed dispute resolution mechanisms to be found in any international 
institution5. 
 
 The Kantian Influence 
Liberals proposed more factors that restraints country to go to war. According to the Kantian 
influence, democracies will refrain from using force against each other; economic trade creates 
incentives to maintain peace; and thirdly, international organizations can constrain decision-
makers by positively promoting peace6. Here we will concentrate on the last two statements, 
namely how the WTO creates incentives to maintain peace and how its organizational structure 
positively promotes peace. The first argument is that trade depends on expectations of peace with 
the trading partner. Violent conflicts endanger access to markets, import, and capital. Liberals 
remind us that it doesn’t make war impossible among disputing states but it does raise the risks 
and costs. The larger the contribution of trade between two countries to their national economies, 
the stronger is the political base that has an interest in preserving peaceful relations between 
them. The creation of the GATT then WTO is in itself an example of how countries were willing 
to institutionalize trade liberalism. 
The second argument about international organization refers to the effectiveness of an 
international governmental organization to promote peace. Here in our case study of the 
GATT/WTO, it reduces uncertainty by providing information about members’ material interest, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, “International Organizations, the politics and process 
of global governance”, p 413 
6 Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, “International relations theories discipline and 
diversity”, (2013). p101	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as well as guiding those interests in a more inclusive and longer-term direction7. This particular 
purpose can better be analyzed in part by the theory of regime treated in next paragraph within 
the neoliberal perspective. 
 
 The Neoliberals and Game Theory 
Neoliberal scholars consider that much of the International Relations prior the twenty century 
seems to conform the realist expectation, however they highlight two historical developments in 
the twentieth century that they believe have made realism an increasingly inaccurate description 
of contemporary global politics8. The first historical evolution is the growth of interdependence 
across a variety of global issues. The relationship among nations is mutually dependent and their 
actions and interests are increasingly entwined9. Interdependence is an important concept for 
liberal. It explains the reasons behind nations’ cooperation. Neoliberal scholars have often used 
game theory to analyze the difficulties in cooperation among states and how to overcome them, 
especially the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) analogy. 
Robert Keohane criticizes the realist theory of hegemonic stability, which describes the 
necessity of the predominance of the single state to maintain order. In his book, After Hegemony, 
Keohane argues that although hegemony can facilitate cooperation, it is not a necessity or a 
condition for it10. Keohane developed what he called a functional theory of regimes to explain 
how cooperation persists, even in the absence of a hegemonic power. He uses examples from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, “International relations theories discipline and 
diversity”, (2013). P102 
8 Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, “International relations theories discipline and 
diversity”, (2013). P115 
9 Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, “International relations theories discipline and 
diversity”, (2013). P 117 
10 Robert O. Keohane. After Hegemony, cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy. Princeton University Press, (1984,2005), p12	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international political-economic and military-security situations to illustrate empirically how 
international regimes incorporate the norm of reciprocity; delegitimize defection; and, thereby 
make non-cooperation more costly. According to him, norms enclose clear injunctions to 
members about legitimate and illegitimate behavior. For instance the norms of the GATT have 
not require its members resort to free trade immediately, but incorporate injunctions for members 
to practice non-discrimination and reciprocity and to move toward increased liberalization.  
Keohane makes the same rationality assumptions, as does realism to explain that a 
substantial amount of cooperation in the international relations of advanced market-economy 
countries is possible because of the rational-choice theory and the theory of collective good. 
Those theories help to show why institutions are significant in world politics, and even crucial to 
successful cooperation. Keohane’s contends that international regimes alter the relative costs of 
transactions. Certain agreements are forbidden. Under the GATT, for instance it is not permitted 
to make discriminatory trade arrangements except under specific conditions. Due to the absence 
of a centralized government, states implement such actions, however their lack of legitimacy 
means that such measures are likely to be costly. Under GATT rules, for instance, retaliation 
against such behavior is justified11. It becomes a serious violation of GATT with serious 
implications for a large number of other issues. 
In terms of the prisoner’s dilemma, the situation has been changed from a single-play to 
an iterated game. Incentive to violate regimes principles has been reduced. International regimes 
decrease the transaction costs of legitimate bargains and augment them for illegitimate ones. 
Regimes can as well influence bureaucratic costs transactions. Successful regimes produce issue-
areas so that productive linkages are facilitated, while destructive linkages and bargains that are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Robert O. Keohane. After Hegemony, cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy. Princeton University Press, (1984,2005), p 89 
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in opposition with regime principles are discouraged12. In world politics, international regimes 
improve the making of agreements by decreasing barriers created by high transaction costs and 
uncertainty. Once an international regime has been established, however, it begins to profit from 
the relatively high and symmetrical level of information that it creates, and from the ways in 
which it makes regime-supporting bargains easier to consummate13. Regimes, such as the 
WTO’s, transform the single-play Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) to an iterated open-ended PD in 
which cooperation may be rational. Social pressure exercised through linkages among issues, 
provides the most compelling set of reasons for governments to comply with their commitments. 
That is, egoist governments may comply with a rule because if they fail to do so, other 
governments will observe their behavior, evaluate it negatively, and perhaps take retaliatory 
action. GATT contains provision for retaliation. Even without using those provisions, Keohane 
explains that governments find it costly to retaliate for the sake of reputation. According to the 
author GATT was created not so much to influence government behavior, but to permit them to 
restrict their leaders successors’ freedom of action. 
In the present case, the latest round DDA, an agreement has not been reached yet. 
Therefore, the incentive described by Keohane and neoliberals that transform the prisoner 
dilemma situation to an iterated game where the organization creates incentive for cooperation 
such as a retaliation mechanism cannot be applied to the DDA because it has no legal authority 
yet. The assumption of the neoliberal argument can only be applied to agreements that are in 
service inside the WTO such as the Uruguay round agreements on services and intellectual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Robert O. Keohane. After Hegemony, cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy. Princeton University Press, (1984,2005), p 92 
13 Robert O. Keohane. After Hegemony, cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy. Princeton University Press, (1984,2005), p 100 
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property. We are not questioning Keohane’s findings, we are only pointing out that those 
incentive mechanisms only apply to countries that signed those particular agreements. The WTO 
counts about 60 different agreements, which have an international legal status. Member countries 
must sign and ratify all WTO agreements on accession. At this point when it comes to 
agriculture the AoA is the current agreement on service for countries. Therefore, The DDA to 
follow up on my assumption is only a place of intense bargaining. 
 
II/ The WTO and the realist paradigm: Is this institution irrelevant? 
 
 Classical Realism: Exploration of three assumptions 
Classical realists stressed the similarities not the differences between domestic and 
international politics. They have a pessimistic view of the state of nature, and recognize that 
communal bonds are fragile and quickly frustrated by the pursuit of unilateral advantage by 
countries. When this happens, time-honored mechanisms of conflict management such as 
alliances and the balance of power might not only fail to keep the peace but may make domestic 
and international violence more likely14. Thucydides and Morgenthau are concerned with 
questions of order, justice and change; we will try to analyses how the WTO could fit in this 
perspective through three assumptions. 
The first assumption contends that there is no central authority to maintain order 
(anarchy). According to Thucydides the domestic passions are the same in international level, 
therefore he would have agreed with Aristotle “the law has no power to compel obedience beside 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, “International relations theories discipline and 
diversity”, (2013). P61 
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the force of habit”15. Morgenthau in the same way regards international politics through the lens 
of domestic politics first and stated “All politics, is a struggle for power that is inseparable from 
social life itself”16. For Morgenthau and Thucydides, communities and the identities and norms 
they help to create and keep are critical factors of order, at home and abroad. In our case, the 
WTO can be regarded as a community that created its own identity and norms. WTO’s principles 
of non-discrimination, reciprocity, transparency, safety valves for public health care, national 
security, domestic industries, and enforcement of obligation (The dispute Settlement Unit)17 
could easily represent those norms and identities to which Morgenthau and Thucydides referred.  
The second assumption we observe is the balance of power. Both Thucydides and 
Morgenthau understand politics as a struggle for power and unilateral advantage. Military 
capabilities and alliance are necessary safeguards in international relations but guarantee the 
peace or the independence of actors. Order, domestic and international ultimately rest on the 
strength of community. The WTO is a status quo type of organization where multilateralism is a 
key component. Every nation is regarded as equal where decisions are made by consensus. 
However the latest DDA, has been the stage of multiple alliance among the global South with the 
creation of the G20 challenging the traditional order of powerful players such as the US and EU. 
It remains to be seen if the strength of the WTO community is strong enough to close this most 
controversial round. It will be interesting to see if the developing countries will concede to any 
last minute deals struck between the USA and EU, or whether some will walk out, forcing a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, “International relations theories discipline and 
diversity”, (2013), p 62  
16 Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, “International relations theories discipline and 
diversity”, (2013), p 62.  
17 Margaret, P. Karns and Karen A., Mingst. “International Organizations, the politics and 
process of global governance”, 2010, p413 
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failure of this round. In either case, with the fact that the anticipated gains looks small, there 
remains a risk that the varying interests among different groupings of these countries could break 
if and when a final deal is brokered18.  
The third assumption examines the tension between self-interest and justice as what 
differentiate the classical and neorealist points of view. For Classical realists, including 
Machiavelli justice is important for two reasons. Policy that is constrained by accepted ethical 
principles and generally supportive of them provides a powerful aura of legitimacy that helps to 
reconcile less powerful actors with their subordinate status19. A demonstrable commitment to 
justice is the most efficient way to create and maintain a kind of community that allows actors to 
translate power into influence. Justice is also important to provide the conceptual scaffolding on 
which actors can intelligently construct balanced national-interests. A certain engagement to 
justice is a powerful self-restraint, which is necessary in direct proportion to one’s power. Weak 
states most often act cautiously because of external constraints. Powerful states sometimes 
overestimate their ability to control events and are seduced into investing their asset and 
reputation in dangerous situation. Internal restraint and external influence are thus closely 
intertwined. Self-restraint in accord with the acknowledged principles of justice both earns and 
sustains the hegemony that makes efficient influence possible20.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Jennifer Clapp, “WTO Agriculture Negotiations: implications for the Global South,” 
Third World Quarterly, 2006p 564 
19 Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, “International relations theories discipline and 
diversity”. Oxford university Press, (2013), p 65-66 
20 Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith, “International relations theories discipline and 
diversity, Oxford university Press, (2013). P 67	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 Structural Realism and Kenneth N. Waltz 
Many contemporary realists believe in the primacy of self-interest over moral principle, 
and regard considerations of justice as inappropriate, and even dangerous foundations on which 
to base foreign policies. At best, appeals to justice can serve to justify or mask policies motivated 
by more concrete material interests21.  
Kenneth Waltz emphasis on the fact that interdependence is a weak understand of what 
forces shape international politics.22 Plato’s utopias describe neighbors leaving in isolation so 
that people could construct their collective life uncontaminated by contact with others. With the 
absence of interdependence, neither conflict nor war is possible. With integration international 
becomes national politics. Waltz refers to Robert Keohane's and Joseph Nye's term of 
"asymmetric interdependence" for relationship of dependence and independence among states. 
Waltz argues that independent states are in a better position than relatively dependent ones. If I 
depend more on you than you depend on me, you can possess different ways of influencing me 
and affecting my fate than the opposite. Omitting the word "dependence", to him masks the 
inequalities that mark the relations of states and makes them all seem to be on the same footing. 
He states that much of international and national politics is about inequalities.  
Realism reveals what liberal institutionalism theory obscures, which is the fact that 
international institutions serve primarily national rather than international interests. Waltz 
mentions, the answer to the question that most liberal institutionalism asked: How are we "to 
account for the willingness of major states to invest resources in expanding international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith. International relations theories discipline and 
diversity. Oxford university Press, (2013), p 65 
22 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War”, International Security, Vol. 25, 
No. 1 (Summer, 2000), p 14	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institutions if such institutions are lacking in significance?" His answer is obvious, to serve what 
powerful states believe to be their interest23.  
Realists insist that institutions have only minimum effects. They noticed that the efficacy of 
states depend on the will of the states. Strong states only use institutions in ways that benefit 
them. According to Waltz, international institutions are created by the more powerful states, and 
the institutions survive in their original form as long as they serve the major interests of their 
creators, or are thought to do so.  
On the shadow of the future, Waltz continues by arguing that States’ perennial 
uncertainty about their fates presses governments to prefer relative over absolute gains. Without 
uncertainty, the leaders of states would no longer have to question themselves how they would 
cooperate tomorrow as well as today. States could combine their efforts amicably and work to 
maximize collective gains without worrying about how each might fare in comparison to others. 
They would no longer worry about how the balance might change later. The problems of 
governments do not come from their short time perspectives. They see the long shadow of the 
future, but they have trouble reading its contours, perhaps because they try to look too far ahead 
and see imaginary dangers24. WTO’s Doha round can be interpreted as a premise of that 
consideration of uncertainty. First, in the bargaining arena of the DDA states are considered 
rational actors that want to maximize their national interest first, and not the international 
interest. They will not agree on something that seems to undermine potential national gains. 
Powerful states worry about how liberalization of agriculture might affect their own market and 
possibly shift the balance of power in the advantage of emerging countries. With the creation of 
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the G20 and the rising power of developing countries such as China, Brazil and India, which are 
gaining weight on multilateral negotiations at the WTO, this might reflect precisely this long 
shadow of the future that makes the tension over potentials gains for countries problematic. 
However, structural realists predict the collapse of organizations that put national interests in 
jeopardy and undermine state sovereignty. Ultimately, for structural realist the DDA is doomed 
to fail because no rational powerful states will sign on an agreement that could potentially 
undermine their growth in favor of developing countries. 
 
III/ Limitations of WTO: Critical perspectives 
 Habermas and the deliberative democracy concept 
Perhaps more than any other democratic theorist, Jurgen Habermas provides a way of 
systematically examining and assessing liberal democratic institutions. With the goal of 
extending and radicalizing democracy, his “deliberative democracy” is a rules-based deliberative 
process that underscores issues of legitimacy and justice. The concept of deliberative as a 
standard for assessing decision-making at the WTO is a great way to show the shortcoming of 
the WTO as a democratic organization. Thus, deliberative democracy helps reveal how 
inadequate legitimating rules and lack of rational deliberation in the WTO yield power politics, 
coerced decision making and unjust outcomes. 
Habermas develops particular components of the public sphere. He argues for politics as a 
type of conversation, based on legitimating rules and cognitive dialogue: “democratic will-
formation draws its legitimating force ... from the communicative presuppositions that allow the 
better arguments to come into play in various forms of deliberation and from the procedures that 
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secure fair bargaining processes25”. For him, corporate and state interests can often coerce 
legitimacy and public consensus through domination, manipulation or commodification of 
culture. Such depoliticisation, such removal of critical discourse and limitation of social choices, 
yield what Habermas calls “ideology26”. The ideal speech situation is aimed precisely at 
minimizing ideology and maximizing decision making by civil society. He emphasizes the need 
to institutionalize through legal and constitutional means the formal conditions of the ideal 
speech situation so as to reduce systematically distorted communication and better regulate, 
guarantee and expand the public sphere. Thus, consensus is produced through argumentation, not 
power politics or by the force of an interlocutor's socioeconomic power27. The overall goal is for 
the community to reflect this consensus in laws and policies. 
Kapoor analyses the WTO as a place to discuss rules about the global market, in the same 
way that a nationally based public sphere may debate regulations governing the national 
economy. The author argues that the WTO qualifies as a public space, in this case a multilateral 
sphere where national representatives deliberate (i.e. they make, defend and adjudicate claims), 
primarily about global economic matters28. WTO is a state-centered institution that claims to be a 
democratic organization29 based on the fact that there is sovereign equality30.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Ilan Kapoor, “Deliberative Democracy and the WTO”, Review of International Political 
Economy, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Aug., 2004), p 523. 
26 The suppression of generalisable social interests through systematically distorted 
communication. 
27 Ilan Kapoor, “Deliberative Democracy and the WTO”, Review of International Political 
Economy, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Aug., 2004), p 524 
28 Ilan Kapoor, “Deliberative Democracy and the WTO”, Review of International Political 
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29 Ilan Kapoor, “Deliberative Democracy and the WTO”, Review of International Political 
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Most of the key deliberations have taken place in restricted, “green room” meetings or caucuses. 
The article notes that several developing countries, especially smaller ones, are “systematically 
absent from not only informal, but also formal meetings”; and when they are present and make 
proposals, it is not uncommon for these to be blocked, ignored or excluded31. This exclusionary 
and exclusivity dimensions of the western “green room” caucuses are signs of illegitimacy. 
According to the author, it is the continual exclusion or neglect of many developing countries in 
important caucus meetings that is the main issue. Caucuses are unclear and non transparent, 
making sure that all members are at least invited to them, or if not, breaking down the criteria for 
inclusion and exclusion. The absence of such rules means, for the author that the most powerful 
western members can continue their strong-arm tactics with impunity. 
Just as there is a politics of inclusion and exclusion that goes on within the WTO's 
multilateral sphere, the author mentions the same process outside of it. Multinational 
corporations (MNCs) have had a significant presence in, so to speak, the 'shadows' of WTO 
deliberations32. In contrast, NGOs, especially critical ones have had a more difficult time 
accessing the WTO. The conclusion of the article is to say that the WTO's multilateral sphere 
involves less deliberation and more compromises and trade-offs, resulting in what Habermas 
calls a 'bargaining' consensus. According to him, “The WTO decision-making process is 
dominated by bargaining instead of arguing”33. Negotiators do not reach solutions and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
member present formally objects to a proposed measure, it carries. If and when a consensus 
cannot be reached, a decision is taken by a majority vote (of two-thirds or three- fourths, 
depending on the nature of the decision). WTO, 1994. 
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compromises with rational arguments by trying to convince each other on what is the best 
solution. The claim that free trade, liberalized markets and technology is beneficial to all WTO 
members may be convincing but reflects an ideology in Habermas sense. This Habermas 
argument supports our first assumption that the DDA is a place of bargaining, rather than a place 
of deliberation. 
 
 WTO organized hypocrisy Richard H. Steinberg 
According to Steinberg, GATT/WTO decision-making rules based on the sovereign 
equality of states are an organized hypocrisy in the procedural context. The powerful countries 
have dominated GATT/WTO legislative bargaining outcomes and agreed with the consensus 
decision-making rule, and related rules that are based on the sovereign equality of states34 only in 
the perspective of generating information that confers legitimacy that can be acceptable by all 
states35. The author notes that it appears to have been a semblance of law-based negotiating in 
the launch phases of the trade Rounds, however powerful western states have dominated and 
coerced most of the rest of the process. Powerful states have controlled agenda setting, and 
rounds have been concluded in the shadow of power to varying degrees36. 
Instead of generating a pattern of Pareto-improving outcomes37 deemed equitable by all 
states, GATT/WTO sovereign equality decision-making rules may be combined with invisible 
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Outcomes in the GATT/ WTO”, International Organization, (March 2002), p 343 
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weighting38 to produce an asymmetric distribution of outcomes of trade rounds. Even if 
developing countries understand exactly why and how the WTO decision-making process leads 
to asymmetrical outcomes, the analysis in this article shows there is little they can do about it. 
The economic power of western countries (together they account for about 40 percent of world 
imports) allows them to absorb costs or potential threats; while small or weaker countries have 
much to lose from trade restrictions and much to gain from access to US/EU markets. According 
to the author, western countries also have at their disposal such “carrots” as increased foreign aid 
or debt rescheduling to buttress their bargaining arsenals, which they often use to win over 
developing countries. This argument made by Steinberg, confirm our hypothesis, that power 
politics is the driving force during trade negotiation. 
 
Conclusion 
The neoliberal contribution in understanding the role of institutions in international 
cooperation is not questionable. Keohane, and game theorists give striking arguments to explain 
how cooperation is not only possible but rational under an anarchic world of egoists. The 
multiple incentives created by the WTO have historically been working in favor of cooperation 
for members’ countries and added a certain sense of fairness to the other world of hegemonic 
power seeking countries described by realists. However, we argue that those mechanisms or 
regime incentives are only applicable when countries have signed and are under legal agreements 
texts. Up to this date, the only text ruling agriculture at the WTO is the AoA, which was under a 
lot of criticism and contributed to the creation of a new round of negotiation. The new round 
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DDA had as an objective to rectify some of the AOA issues and overall strengthening of 
underdeveloped countries. According to our first assumption, the DDA needs therefore to be 
considered as a platform where countries bargain their preferences, and until an agreement is 
reach, power politics is the basis for negotiation. The realists, especially the classical ones such 
as Thucydides and Morgenthau help us to understand the role that power politics plays inside 
any type of community. Their view on the dynamic of identities, norms, alliances and 
community strength is enlightening as to how conflict is generated inside of a community. The 
latest WTO round (DDA) would definitely illustrate the role of power politics in bargaining 
negotiation and would be able to taste the strength of the WTO as a community. The question is 
to examine whether or not the WTO essence (purpose of its creation) has strong enough norms to 
find a solution to this never ending bargaining process that is the DDA. These realists open the 
door for normative considerations to take the front row and deeply criticize internal procedures at 
the WTO. The concept of deliberative democracy helps us to question the roots of decision-
making mechanisms. Even though the institutional characteristics of the WTO make it a unique 
example for international cooperation (multilateralism, dispute settlement unit), some crucial 
points, such as the fact that the WTO is producing non pareto –improving outcomes39, or that 
members are excising some invisible weighting, are enough to put WTO under methodic 
criticism. It is now more than ever the most important moment to look at which final path the 
negotiations on DDA will take. Does normative consideration on agriculture have a place in the 
debate over agriculture liberalization? Do powerful western countries frustrate any prospective 
gains for the South? Does the nature of the WTO as a forum for trade liberalization offer enough 
to close a deal on the DDA?  According to Neoliberals, WTO needs to stick to its principles of 
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trade liberalization and close a deal that benefits collectively all members. According to classical 
realists the future of the WTO is powerful states using restrain power to better influence a 
closing on the Doha round beneficial to powerful states. According to structural realists the DDA 
will most likely have no future. It will collapse if the powerful states cannot impose their 
interests on weaker states, and if the decision at the WTO goes against national sovereignty. 
According to the normative and critical theorists, the future of the WTO is to increase 
deliberative democracy where ethical concerns such as the right to food, civil society such as 
environmental NGOs have a share in the decisional process to close the round on a note of 
justice. The future can only tell us if a conclusion of DDA can happened and in what extend will 
it be beneficial to developing countries, in the meantime based on the latest development of the 
round and on a case study of Brazil’s dispute case against American cotton subsidy, we will look 
at which scenario is more likely to take place. 
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Chapter 2 : WTO Treatment of agriculture, the DDA Perspectives 
and the AoA Pillars 
 
The institutional evolution of the WTO serves as an excellent case study for illustrating 
the importance of institutional design to collective gains and cooperation in an anarchic 
environment such as was described in Chapter I. However, we cannot ignore the fact that each of 
the previous eight Rounds has resulted in asymmetrical deals favoring the largest most 
economically powerful states relative to and sometimes at the expense of their less powerful 
counterparts. This is not a surprise given the fact that the countries’ members differ dramatically 
in their capabilities to engage in competitive negotiation platforms as evidenced by the gleanings 
from Chapter I. In view of these different observations, one can question the DDA in its capacity 
to truly engage developmental material for the Global South, as stated in the early phase of its 
creation. This section seeks to analyze the major shortcomings of the DDA and therein 
understand why twelve years after its launch the Round’s closing is still very problematic. In the 
opening pages, I will present how the development content of the Round dropped from the high 
benefits to insignificant. Following, I will explain how the particular treatment of agriculture 
based negotiations appear to change multiples aspect of AoA’s pillars but in reality only create 
situational smokescreens and no real substantial change. And finally, I will address the power-
politics interplay during the Round reflecting a certain fragility of the Global South alliance and 
its long-term implications.  
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I/ The failure of the development content at the DDA: From High to 
insignificant 
 
The Doha Development Agenda (DDA) had as its central objectives the improvement of the 
trading prospects for developing countries. The Round was officially launched at the WTO’s 
Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001. The Doha Ministerial 
Declaration provided the mandate for the negotiations, including on agriculture, services and an 
intellectual property, which had began earlier. Its aim was to achieve major reforms to the 
international trading system through the introduction of lower trade barriers and revised trade 
rules. The work program covers about 20 different areas of trade. The fact that the DDA has 
experienced an assortment of issues, problems, and troubles added further fuel to criticisms that 
the WTO was becoming increasingly unable to serve as a platform for trade liberalization. Some 
scholars note the fact that moments of crisis and collapse have been part of all multilateral trade 
negotiations since, and including, the original negotiation of the WTO’s predecessor institution, 
the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) in 1947, it is thus not surprising that DDA 
should be struggling at this juncture. They also acknowledge the fact that moments of crisis in 
trade Rounds have actually functioned to reexamine expectations and force the production of 
alternative nevertheless not always innovative solutions that help move negotiations forward. Let 
us look in detail at the different points of contention, that is, those key-shifting moments during 
the past twelve years and the implications thereof, from the perspective of relative gains for 
countries affected.  
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 The DDA and distribution benefit in number: The computable general equilibrium 
(CGE model) 
The DDA has been the subject of a large number of economic analyses using computable 
general equilibrium modeling to examine the size and distribution of benefits. These models 
have over time sponsored the fact that the DDA is developmental. Progressively some estimates 
show a significant fall of likely benefits that will flow to developing countries from trade 
liberalization40. For example, two of the most recent estimates of the likely Doha scenarios found 
that the benefits accruing to developing countries from a conclusion of the DDA (in terms of the 
broad agreement that looks likely to occur) are in the region of US$6.7–21.5 billion, out of total 
welfare gains of between $38.4 billion and $43 billion. In other world, the DDA is “worth about 
$3 per year, or less than a cent a day, for each person in the developing world” 41. The most 
important is that these mild gains are highly unevenly distributed, with only a couple of large 
developing countries (primarily China, India and Brazil) gaining the biggest share of benefits, 
while many of the remaining developing countries, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, are most likely 
to be left worse off by the DDA. According to the article we can conclude that much of the 
development component of the DDA has been lost over the course of the negotiations.  
The authors also affirm that given the strong consensus among delegates at the Geneva 
Ministerial Conference that the settled text should state the basis for future negotiations without 
being altered, the eventual DDA agreement, even if it were ever to be concluded, is likely to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 James Scott and Rorden Wilkinson, “What Happened to Doha in Geneva? 
Re-engineering the WTO’s Image While Missing Key Opportunities,” European Journal of 
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41 James Scott, Rorden Wilkinson, “What Happened to Doha in Geneva? 
Re-engineering the WTO’s Image While Missing Key Opportunities,” European Journal of 
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remain within the parameters already set out on which these modeling exercises (CGE models) 
were constructed. Retrospectively, The Geneva Ministerial meeting could have been a good 
opportunity and forum to recalibrate from the DDA’s original stance and reassess where 
agreement had been reached and revisit whether or not it was fulfilling its original aims. This, in 
turn, would have provided a chance for a renewed concentration on the development component 
of the Round. Instead, the article accused the Geneva Ministerial of been useless; it only restated 
support for the flawed package that had been arrived at over the past eight years of limping 
negotiations, and reaffirmed this package as the basis for moving forward.42.  
Based on the prognosis of the CGE model we can affirm that the potentials gains for 
developing countries are null, if not insignificant. Therefore we can conclude even without 
having access to how precisely each countries were negotiating inside a very private setting to 
assess the balance of power argument, that after eight years of negotiations the first outcome is 
no materials gain for weaker states. After eight years of negotiation, the first noticeable result is a 
significant shift in potential economic gains for developing countries. The Geneva Ministerial 
conference represents a win for powerful states and a significant step back for weaker states.  
 
 The progress of negotiations: a downfall of miss opportunities 
When the DDA was launched, the majority of developing countries were convinced that the 
Round should redress the imbalance of the Uruguay Round and previous GATT agreements; 
enable developing countries to negotiate on the basis of less than full reciprocity; and give 
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special consideration to the interests of developing countries43. Developing countries especially 
African one were particular concern about beginning a new round of negotiation at Doha because 
they would be required to take on further obligations, included new areas such as the 
environment and labor standards as well as the ‘Singapore issues’ of investment, government 
procurement, trade facilitation and competition policy. The last Uruguay round has been costly 
to implement and had failed to give them the benefits they had envisaged. One of the major 
request from the developing countries was their concerns for the lacked of resources and 
technical capacity to undertake negotiations in these new areas. When the round was launched, 
the industrial countries fallowed a tactic of ‘filibustering’ within the Committee on Special and 
Differential Treatment by automatically postponing the talks on implementation issues and on 
making the special and differential treatment clauses in the WTO agreements more doable. This 
tactic was successful44. By the time of the September 2003 Cancun ministerial conference, 
nothing had been agreed45.  
The main concerns were located on the way in which the industrial countries had 
implemented key agreements, especially the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) and the 
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC). Both agreements had been implemented in a way as 
to reduce the liberalization of these heavily protected markets. There is copious and diverse 
literature capturing how the interest of developing countries slowly dwindled from the DDA’s 
different negotiating phases. First in the run-up to the Doha conference, articles described during 
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subsequent years, a certain lack of progress in the particular matter of implementation issues46. 
By the time of the Hong Kong Ministerial of 2005, nothing really substantial had been reached, 
and the Ministerial Declaration only agreed to “…redouble efforts to find appropriate solutions 
as a priority to outstanding implementation-related issues”47. Finally, by the 2009 Geneva 
Ministerial Conference implementation had been very discretely dropped, with only the LDC 
group referring to the issue. The once absolute requirement for the developing countries to enter 
into a new Round of multilateral trade negotiations (to enter the DDA) looks like it had been 
quietly and perhaps intentionally marginalized. We can conclude that the implementation issues 
went nowhere, however developing countries had some better success with fighting the 
Singapore issues. Although their successes in this area ensured that they have had to give away 
somewhere else, thereby contributing further to the emptying out of the development content of 
the round. Many developing countries had been deeply opposed to the negotiation of the 
Singapore issues, but these had been included in the DDA primarily at the insistence of the EU, 
with support from Japan and South Korea, among others. Indeed, it was largely because of the 
lack of support from the US (except on the issue of Government Procurement), and therefore the 
lack of a united front by the two most powerful WTO members, that developing countries were 
able successfully (and eventually) to oppose negotiation of the Singapore issues. However, this 
was only after the developing countries had played a key role in forcing the collapse of the 
Cancun Ministerial, resulting in the ejection of three of the Singapore issues from the 
negotiations, with only trade facilitation continuing.  
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Second, a body of literature has taken a different approach than the potentials materials 
gains, and concentrate on qualitative aspects of gains. Rather than analyzing the projected gains 
from liberalization based on scenarios drawn from different points in the negotiations such as the 
CGE models, these studies focus on detailed examinations of the pattern and progress of the 
negotiations. They basically study the likely opportunities accruing to certain countries from a 
concluded trade deal48. They find an outcome for developing countries that is not only poor 
overall but also constrains them into specific and predetermined categories of (largely 
agricultural) production, which also tend to limit the capabilities for diversification. Thus they 
argue that the focus of negotiations in the Round should not only be on finding ways of 
increasing the liberalization cut to enhance the projected aggregate gains for the least developed 
(as is often the case); but also, and most importantly on addressing the invisible barriers to 
industrial diversification that are thrown up by a particular pattern of negotiating49. Scott 
Wlikinson recognizes that, for the Doha Round to be more successful, and to approximate better 
the sentiments of the G20, a qualitative shift in the negotiations is more than necessary. This 
finding encourages us to think that it is not just the fall in the overall levels of gain predicted by 
CGE models that is alarming when considering the potential outcome of Doha for LDCs. What 
makes this particularly worrisome is that any liberalization of agriculture under Doha, as seen 
earlier, is likely to be limited; and focusing on agriculture as the primary vehicle for development 
instead of looking at industrial diversification and implementation issues of other WTO 
agreements, only constrains LDCs into an agriculture-based development strategy that 
simultaneously yields little but reduces the possibility to diversify into other sectors which have 
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higher value50.  Here we can conclude that both, quantitative data such as the CGE models and 
qualitative information such as the fact that the DDA locks LDCs in an undiversified agriculture, 
both predict irrelevant gains for the weaker countries. Not only the materials gains are almost 
null, but also the particular interest of weaker countries such the implementation issues discuss 
early on in the Round has been totally ignored by the Geneva Ministerial conference from the 
DDA draft.  
 
II/ The special issue of agriculture: Changing everything to change nothing 
The incapacity of the WTO’s predecessor institution, the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), to liberalize agriculture while permitting the industrial countries to build up large 
subsidies for their agricultural sectors has been a continued source of pressure and contention 
between agricultural exporting and importing members. The DDA was supposed to rectify these 
flaws and come up with the liberalization that the Uruguay Round had failed to create. 
Originally, even if it were not designed this way, over time the agricultural platform has come to 
be regarded as the primary “developmental” aspect of the DDA.  
 
 The AoA pillars: The global south demands, The EU and US counterproposition 
	  
Agricultural liberalization within the DDA’s first seven rounds was very limited and 
considerable high subsidy regimes in the EU and US were constructed without going against 
DDA rules and with certain indifference to their effects on developing countries. The members 
committed to specific and comprehensive elements such as:  
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• Substantial improvements in market access;  
• Reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies;  
• And substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support’51.  
The authors Sona Hawkes and Jagjit Kaur Plahe, analyze the three pillars that constitute the 
AoA and the different propositions by the EU, US, and Global South to reform it. The AoA’s 
pillars are namely, domestic support with the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS)52, export 
competition, and market access. In the first pillar (domestic support), there is a classification of 
three boxes ruling government support, namely: amber, green, and blue. The Amber Box 
represents trade-distorting subsidies and is the only category subject to cuts. A de minimis 
provision allows some trade-distorting support: up to 5 percent of the total value of agricultural 
production and 5 percent of support for a given product (10 percent in both cases in developing 
countries)53. The green box key feature is to give direct payments via state-administered social-
security systems that cannot be directly linked to production or price support54.  Lastly, regarding 
the blue box categorization; it allows payments to producers wherein the difference between the 
market price and a higher government-issued target price protects producers from low prices and 
is heavily utilized by such players as the EU, Japan, and the USA. 
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The first phase of the negotiations highlighted a range of concerns about AoA’s impact on 
the capacity of a state to guarantee the right to food. Developing countries emphasized on 
protecting and enhancing their domestic food-production capacity, an end to the blue box, reform 
of the green box, proposals to stop the SSG (Special Agricultural Safeguard), and create an SSM 
(special safeguard mechanism), a food security box calling for flexibility for developing 
countries, etc… EU and USA in particular rejected the Global South demands and produced a 
joint narrative that proposed a scenario in favor of an increase in trade-distortion supported under 
the AMS. For example the EU maintain high tariffs for such important exports developing 
country as sugar and dairy based products. After the Uruguay Round, developing countries have 
strongly resisted being excluded.  
The authors underline that their alternative proposition recognized the responsibility of states 
to uphold the right to food. In an effort to bring together the various divides, in February 2003 
the Chair of Agriculture from the DDA, Stuart Harbinson offered a 60 percent reduction in trade-
distorting subsidies under the AMS with a cap on product-specific support, a 50 percent decrease 
in the Blue Box subsidies, a Blue Box cap, and a disciplining of the Green Box. He also 
proposed the elimination of export subsidies over nine years and rules to cover export credit and 
food aid. On market access, he suggested important reductions in tariffs, with developing 
countries able to signify an unspecified number of “Special Products” subject to lower cuts. 
Furthermore, Harbinson called for a termination to developed-country’s use of the SSG and for 
an SSM for developing countries to protect food security and livelihoods. Even though the 
Harbinson text fell far short of Global South demands, both the EU and the USA rejected it. The 
EU was not willing to reduce tariffs or eliminate export subsidies. The USA was not willing to 
decrease domestic support and wanted more tariff cuts. In August 2003, the EU and the USA 
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produced a joint text. The proposal was carefully constructed to ensure that the EU could 
maintain high tariffs for important exports to developing countries (such as sugar and dairy 
produce) while undermining the capacity of developing countries to protect their own markets 
through tariff protection. In addition to this blatant insult, the EU-US text became the basis of the 
draft Cancun Ministerial Declaration circulated on 31 August 2003. At Cancun the new Global 
South coalitions were united and agreed that they would not accept the EU–US position as an 
official ministerial declaration. In 2004, negotiations resumed with a revised format, changed 
from a series of proposals moderated by the Chair to direct meetings of members and coalitions, 
large and small, to collectively negotiate an agreed text. Many felt that the dynamics of the 
negotiations had shifted55. In accepting the July 2004 Framework, the participating Global South 
members agreed to trim around the edges of a heavily flawed agreement, and surrendered their 
opportunity to wind back the AoA so as to reverse its detrimental impacts on the right to food.  
I will go into more depth as to the signification of right-to-food consideration in the 
following chapter. Here, the important and fundamental point for the research is to understand 
how, even under a proposed text by Harbinson that was most likely equitable, we observe a 
strong resistance from the EU and USA against the proposed text, and how they significantly 
bargained for their own interest rather than talking the global South demands in consideration. 
After intense years of negotiation and multiple sources of pressure on the south alliance, the shift 
in negotiation appear to incontestably give the upper hand to powerful countries and present a 
scenario where the weaker countries give up an important foothold. The commitment of 
substantial improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms 
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of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support look far from 
being achieve by the EU and USA text proposal of July 2004.  
 
 The cotton problem 
Some highly contentious areas amongst which still some are very problematic is cotton. This 
particular issue has been, perhaps not coincidentally pushed to one side; and still has to be 
tackled. Accorded a special place in the DDA following the July Package decision of 1 August 
2004, cotton was suppose to be treated “ambitiously, expeditiously and specifically” within the 
agriculture negotiations (WTO, 2004). As Director-General Pascal Lamy has said, “cotton has 
become a litmus test of the commitment to make the WTO Doha Round of global trade 
negotiations a truly development Round”56. For the so-called “Cotton Four’” (Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Chad and Mali), which possess enormous leverage and commercial interest as cotton 
producers, ending US cotton subsidies and the depressive effect they have on world cotton prices 
is not only a priority but a matter of survival.57 They have received strong support from the larger 
developing countries. However, the position has been that it will be impossible to complete a 
deal on the DDA without addressing cotton. The Cotton Four want cotton to be dealt separately 
from the agricultural negotiations and want the issue to be deal in the early phase to testify the 
development aspect of the DDA. By contrast, the United States maintains that cotton should be 
dealt with only after the agricultural deal has been finalized. This represent an issue in that if 
cotton is left until the other major components of the Round are finalized, the cotton producers 
will find themselves under extreme pressure not to obstruct the deal. Though the developing 
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countries have so far been united in demanding a strong deal on cotton if the round is to be 
concluded, this unity has yet to be tested and will also find itself under severe strain once the 
other parts of the DDA are concluded 58. If a few poor African countries find themselves isolated 
against the massive machine that is the US (and others) opposition, they will find it almost 
impossible to withstand the pressure to accept a compromise, however weak59. What will be the 
final deal on cotton will illustrate how truly developmental the DDA has been, and constitute a 
very good indicator of power politics inside the negotiation phase at the DDA. It paints the 
image of David against Goliath, and will represent the efficacy of the WTO as an institution to 
truly represent opportunities for collective gains for all members. 
 
III/ The fragile alliance of the global south and the future of WTO:  
 The G20 and power politics: the game of alliance and exclusion 
Jennifer Clapps argue that developing countries were considered as pivotal in changing the 
dynamic of the agriculture negotiation. In the early phase of the talks the negotiation process was 
largely “top-down” and the important battles in agriculture were fought between the USA and 
the EU. Concern over both the process and the content of the talks prompted the global South to 
walk out at the 2003 Cancun Ministerial Meeting. At this time new developing country coalitions 
emerged, including the G-20 Group on Agriculture, and have since been key in changing the 
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dynamic of the talks to be more bottom- up and consultative60. Developing countries were 
instrumental in changing the dynamics of the agriculture talks, however this change might not be 
enough to guaranty that the content of the agreement is acceptable to all countries of the Global 
South61.  
The emergence of key alliances of developing countries just before the Cancun Ministerial 
was a consequence on the outcome of their ongoing frustration with respect to the early phases of 
the talks. These groups effectively put pressure on the USA and the EU, forcing a change of 
dynamic, as was apparent in Cancun62. Throughout the post-Cancun phase of the talks, the G-20 
has worked hard to show solidarity with other developing country groups. But, while India’s and 
Brazil’s membership in the FIPs63 is significant for the Global South coalition in that it 
demonstrates the importance of incorporating the voice of developing countries, it did bring 
criticism from other developing countries, and potentially shows fragility on the part of the 
broader south coalition. It was a demand for a more transparent process and incorporation of 
developing country views that spawned the G-20 and other groups in the first place, but bringing 
India and Brazil into the elite group of negotiating countries only sparked new complaints about 
lack of transparency and inclusiveness. The G-20 acknowledged the tension with other 
developing country groups, and tried at Hong Kong to reinvigorate the cohesion of all the 
developing country groups by focusing on their points of agreement on broad issues. While there 
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are a lot of issues that have still need to be hammered out before the full modalities can be 
accepted, it is unclear that this alliance will last. Now it appears that no matter what deal will be 
adopted the gains are most likely insignificant and largely uneven across the Global South. In 
this context it is ironic that the shifts in the negotiation process to include more developing 
country representatives may at the end lead to a weakening of developing country solidarity on 
agricultural trade issues because of the uneven impact within the Global South of a potential 
agriculture deal. This process illustrates what Habermas and critical theorist deplores about the 
WTO: the lack of argumentation to resolve trading issues rather than bargaining process based 
on material perspective gain. It remains to be seen if the developing countries will concede to 
any last minute deals struck between the USA and EU, or whether some will walk out, forcing a 
failure of the round. In either case, it now looks as if any developing country gains will be 
marginal at best and, there remains a risk that the varying interests among different groupings of 
these countries could fracture if and when a final deal is brokered64.  
On the other side, structural and political forces balance out against a moderation of the 
(currently highly problematic) US position in the DDA. The United States continues to suffer 
from a massive (though reduced) trade deficit, making it politically more and more difficult for 
the Obama Administration to put a deal through Congress that does not redress what many on 
Capitol Hill see as ‘unfair’ trade practices of key trading partners, notably China (see Scott, 
2007)65. Given the extent of political capital required to push a skeptical public and even more 
skeptical (if not outright hostile) Congress into accepting legislation to decrease US carbon 
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emissions, and the ongoing arguments on health-care reform, it is likely that an unpopular trade 
deal will be impossible for Obama to tackle66. This will be done at the expense of the developing 
nations fragile alliance. These considerations remind us that national interests are a significant 
driving force behind negotiation at the WTO. Ignoring the role of national domestics dynamics 
into the balance of factors pushing trade negotiation is a mistake. American position at the DDA 
reflects their national interest, as well as EU position. 
 The strongest members, the United States and European Union, have historically been able 
to impose the broad shape of trade rounds, however this higher position has been eroded (though, 
importantly, both still retain a de facto veto on any outcome). According to James Scott and 
Robert Wilkinson the old order which represent the developed countries has been very unhurried 
to recognize the changing economic reality and is yet to adjust to their less privileged position67. 
Economic growth, lessons for development policy and new commercial opportunities are all 
situated in the emerging countries, giving them a much more important position. This very 
important economic position of certain members of the developing South could reflect the reason 
of deadlocks in DDA. Waltz argued for a shadow of future that precisely refrain countries to 
cooperate because of the uncertainty on how the balance of power can shift in the future. The 
E.U and U.S could not easily capitulate over their agricultural sector protectionism measures in 
favor of comparative advantages that countries such as Brazil or India have over agriculture 
production. Despite the stronger position of Brazil, India and China, we need to be careful before 
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concluding that the WTO is getting more inclusive. There is an important distrust among the 
other developing member countries. They are reticent about the fact that those three, particularly 
India and Brazil, somehow collectively and comprehensively represent the interests of all 
developing countries. Other developing countries continue to experience exclusion and criticize 
the lack of transparency. Including in a few large and emerging economies into the mix, these 
being the fast-growing developing countries into the exclusive circle of powerful countries does 
not make the WTO more developmental, nor does it make the institution more inclusive. Rather, 
it has the worst effect of masking the continued exclusion of the majority of poor members and 
threatens to lend an unwarranted veneer of greater legitimacy to WTO procedures.  
 
 Pursuing Trade Objectives Through Regional and Bilateral Means 
 There has been a rapid proliferation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) that undermine the 
WTO’s most- favored-nation principle by allowing countries to give preferential trading terms to 
FTA partners. The FTA offers improved market access, however it could potentially present 
multiples problem for developing countries. Benefits under these ‘managed trade systems’ can 
be short-lived if a country also offers these conditions to new FTA partners. Some free-trade 
advocates, such as Bhagwati (2008), criticize FTAs for destroying the principle of 
nondiscrimination and highlight that bilateral negotiations disadvantage weaker nations68. After 
eight years in the round and no visible sign of its conclusion, some intimately familiar processes 
and close observers thereof have sought to pursue market-opening opportunities through bilateral 
and regional means. The result is that, though bilateral and regional deals may provide more stable 
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preferential access to the world’s biggest markets for underdeveloped countries, unfortunately, 
they also frequently further open developing countries’ agricultural sectors to subsidized exports. 
In addition, bilateral trade agreements usually go beyond tariffs and market access to include 
areas of regulation that are critical to developmental policy space such as intellectual property 
law, locking developing countries into providing more stringent patent protection than required 
by the WTO and liberalizing investment rules69. Traditionally it is essentially due to these 
problems, despite some of the WTO’s flaws, that developing countries usually choose to regulate 
their commercial relations with the richest countries within the WTO institutional framework 
rather than in bilateral and plurilateral trade deals. This new tendency puts the developing 
countries at a disadvantage in negotiations with rich countries. 
 
Conclusion 
The final deal will barely resemble what was envisaged in the original mandate. In fusing 
together the insights of economic models on the predicted outcome of the DDA with a 
qualitative analysis of the pattern of the progress of the negotiations we see that the likely gains 
for weak countries from the Doha Round are both small and deeply problematic. Implementation 
issues, a key requirement for the developing countries in the run-up to the launch of the DDA, 
have been dropped out of the negotiations. The move towards a focus on agriculture as the core 
development content of the Round is deeply questionable. Not only does it lock developing 
countries in a non-diversify developmental strategy (agriculture is seen as the only 
developmental prospect), further, it also is problematic because of a lack of commitment on the 
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part of the US and EU to truly shift agricultural protectionism. They undermine the capacity for 
subsidy box shifting, as well as the inadequacy of the attention paid to issues like cotton. LDC 
participation is both a requirement (for a deal to be agreed on the basis of a single undertaking) 
and optimal (developmentally, through opening up markets to their exports), the necessity of 
ensuring their continued participation in this round is crucial. It must give them space to pursue 
an industrialization strategy, offer real market openings in areas of immediate and future value, 
and address outstanding implementation issues. The chances of even this bare minimum 
resulting, however, look slight. 
 At this point of time, DDA or not, the fact that developmental goals are seriously 
diminished or nonexistent, that the possible opportunity for agricultural benefits only concern a 
few developing country (China, Brazil, India) leaving LDC out of potential gains, and giving the 
fact that power politics in the realists sense have more likely play significant role in the shaping 
the latest draft of DDA (the 2008 draft), one can conclude that the once neoliberal case study 
champion in term of cooperation and collective gains theory is more than exposing itself and 
showing shortcomings that reflect more pessimistic outcomes. The emergence of a push to 
separate the WTO from the Doha Round in an attempt to salvage the Organization from any 
negative outcome in the negotiations has been discussed. This option is presented as an absolute 
necessity and the only way to preserve the liberalization project that the WTO is understood to 
oversee. While it is doubtful that this option would seriously be considered, it does have 
significance in pointing out the perceptions of the failure state of the negotiations and the 
dramatic action required70. Through out the years of negotiation the alliance of the developing 
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countries showed more cracked than anything else. After conceding crucial issues, the interest of 
the powerful states looks more represented in the final draft of the round and the balance of 
power seems to have shifted away from the LDCs. Therefore, a conclusion of the DDA will not 
modify substantially the agricultural sector of powerful countries, the shadow of the future look 
brighter than at the initial stage of negotiation for developed countries and seems not threatening 
to U.S and European interests. In this light we can assert that our hypothesis of power politics as 
the driving force behind negotiations at the WTO appears to be confirms based on these 
developments at the DDA. 
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Chapter 3 : A unique normative approach or what constitute the 
right to food 
 
One particular article by Shona Hawkes and Jagjit Plahe analyzes the specific 
implications of the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) with respect to 
the right to food for developing countries. Several studies have analyzed the AoA and the 
dynamics of the Doha Development Round (DDR) however; this article offers a somewhat 
unique aspect by specifically focusing on the implications of the agreement and WTO proposals 
to amend it from a food rights perspective. First, we will present the theoretical framework of the 
authors. We will then discuss the literature employed by the authors to analyze the issue and 
finally we will assess the pertinence of their argument. 
 
I/ A unique normative approach or what constitute the right to food  
 What is the right to Food? 
First, the originality of the authors’ discussion is that they place the traditional economist 
perspective of the WTO with human rights considerations. Here the authors refer to various 
human rights conventions that comprise a right of availability and access to food, embodying the 
principles of sustainability and utilization. The authors noted that even if those conventions in 
international law existed for 30 years, the United Nations only took action in 2009 to address 
right-to-food violations. The right to food requires a certain amount or degrees of obligations and 
accountability for states. Three points define such obligations: 
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* "Respect", translated to mean that state does not prevent access to food,  
* "Protect" meaning that state protects individuals from enterprises or individuals who may 
deprive them of such access, and  
* “Fulfill-facilitate”, which implies work to strengthen people’s entitlements to food71.  
The authors point out that out of the 153 WTO’s members, 127 have ratified the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) supervising the right to food.  
Second, the authors contend that the right to food is part of a bigger food security 
paradigm. Entitlement theory presented comprehensive evidence to link food access and human 
rights perspective. Food sovereignty declarations emphasize the human right to food, land rights, 
fairer trade rules, social justice, agro-ecology, and farmers’ role in decision-making. The central 
point of food sovereignty is the right of states or communities to determine their own food 
policies and destinies. By contrast, the authors represent the argument of rights-based analysis 
and neo-classical economics that believe free market is the best-equipped engine to address food 
concerns. 
 
 Food regime and the neoclassic free-trade argument  
In this section we present the literature that the authors relied on to explore neoclassic 
economics theory such as Friedmann and McMichael's and their work on food regime. The 
authors reuse their typology and definition, which describes food regime as “a rule- governed 
structure of production and consumption of food on a world scale”72. The first type of food 
regime is colonial-settler regime or “free trade imperialism” characterized by cheap food and raw 
materials from the global South to meet Europe’s industrialization needs. The second food 
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regime emphasized the intervention of government in agriculture such as; import controls, export 
subsidies, and national farm programs, which conducted to large surplus. The regime is 
characterized by North/South flows of food as programs directed at distributing food surpluses as 
food aid. 
The authors utilize McMichael’s third food regime emerging from the economic shocks 
of the 1980s and explain that the AoA is part of that third corporate food regime. This regime is 
described as a corporate model of industrial and transgenic agriculture; an alternative model, 
which focus on rural livelihoods, ecology, land rights, social justice, and food sovereignty; and a 
political institutional context directed by corporate interests as well as geopolitics. The authors 
point out an important fact being that in 1990 food security was “redefined, and institutionalized 
in the WTO as an inter-nationally managed market relation” to secure the interest of the US 
agribusiness. They remind us of the objective of the AoA as “to provide for substantial 
progressive reductions on agricultural support and protection sustained over an agreed period of 
time, resulting in correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions in world agricultural 
markets73. 
The authors argue that there is controversial view on the benefits and parameters of free 
trade among neoclassical economists. In general they argue that free trade will reduce market 
distortions, increase productivity, and create universal rules leading to fairer relations for weak 
countries. The authors refer to the work of Kreuger and Tullock to present the neoclassical 
argument that oppose the intervention of government because it can distort markets and lead to 
rent-seeking, rewarding less effective and elite actors. They argue that states can best support 
human rights by restructuring the global trade system, prioritizing mid- and long-term gains of 
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free trade over short-term hardship of transition as a country redirects resources to develop its 
comparative advantage. After presenting what constitute the right to food and the neoclassical 
argument that supports liberalization of agriculture, the authors analyze in more specific details 
what are the consequences or repercussion of the AoA’ rules for developing countries and for the 
right to food paradigm. 
 
II/ Food security and global South 
 Does the AoA address food security? 
The authors made several observations. First, despite various references to food security the 
WTO does not pay any specific attention or attempts to define the term. Second, the Uruguay 
Round concluded with recognition that the AoA was imperfect, but claimed to lay the 
foundations for freer trade in subsequent negotiations. However, the AoA does not reference the 
right to food, and the security food problem was recognized as a non-trade concern (NTC) and 
needed to be review at the next negotiation round. The author explains that the main concessions 
to the right to food by the WTO were made during the Marrakesh Decision on measures 
concerning the possible negative effects of the reform program on least-developed and net food-
importing developing countries where it recognized that stopping protectionist policies, which 
artificially lower food prices, free trade liberalization could raise global prices. Therefore, the 
Marrakesh Decision outlined non-legally binding commitments and mechanisms to address such 
impacts for net food importing developed countries and least-developed countries74. Finally, the 
authors make an important observation by pointing out that even after the world food price 
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spikes in 1996, and the 2007-08-food price crise, the Marrakesh Decision has yet to be enacted. 
According to the authors the reason as to why the delay rests on the fact that the WTO does not 
have a mechanism to determine the AoA’s impacts on food insecurity. 
 
 The AoA’ pillars: a negative impact for the global South 
The authors analyze the three pillars that constitute the AoA and look at how they affect the 
right to food paradigm that we analyzed earlier in Section One. With respect to the first pillar, 
the USA and EU heavily utilize the green box functionality and composition for export-subsidy 
reductions by shifting from direct to indirect subsidies. The authors argues these procedures 
result in “dumping” which has impacts on livelihoods and entitlements that hinder access to food 
in at least two ways. Not only does it enable developing-country producers to have a fair export 
price to compete against subsidized products on world market, and ensures their continued 
sustainability. But, it also allows subsidized products to be dumped on the global south as food 
aid and therefore sold below local production prices.  
With respect to the second pillar, export competition, the authors maintain that even if the 
cuts to exports subsidies were viewed as a key achievement of the AoA, they believe that in 
many cases, this was achieved by simply shifting to the indirect export subsidies classification 
permitted under the blue and green boxes categories. The last pillar of the AoA’ market-access is 
central to the AoA and adheres to a process called tariffication75. The authors give us multiple 
reasons as to why this process under market-access undermines the right to food. First, 
developed countries have more heterogeneous tariffs, while developing countries favor simpler 
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structures and therein allowing developed countries to apply higher bound tariffs on high-volume 
imported goods while undertaking a large percentage cut on already low tariffs for products with 
little or no domestic production. Second, only countries that undertook tariffication could access 
the SSG 76 where WTO members registered products they wanted before the AoA took effect, 
therein, leaving limited access to the developing countries because only a few had NTBs. Of the 
66 countries that are eligible to use SSG only 22 comprise of developing countries. 
The authors assert different conclusions on the market-access pillar. They argue that it 
deprived developing countries of key tools to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to food while 
diminishing their already limited access to heavily protected global North markets. They argue 
that the ease of implementing import or export taxes (from Developed imported product) has 
decreasing revenue for government from those tariffs, therefore reducing the resource of 
developing government programs to fulfill the right to food. They argue that raising tariffs is an 
inescapable arsenal in developing countries’ main toolbox as it ensures to protect domestic 
markets from dumping. Finally, the authors argue that access to markets was restricted stemming 
from tactics of dirty tariffication and the SSG. They give a striking example on how those high 
tariffs kept developing country producers out of export markets for products such as sugar, 
cereals, meat, and dairy produce. 
 
 Concluding implication: the AoA is biased 
The authors ask a pertinent question. Although states agreed to uphold the right-to-food, does 
this mean that their participation in international organizations such as the WTO, compels them 
the leverage to now incur an automatic responsibility for the right-to-food? Their answer is a 
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positive one; as they contend that at a minimum, states should follow the “do not harm” 
principle. The same way as to highlight legal grounds for how WTO members violate their right-
to-food responsibilities if they undermine another state’s capacity to respect, protect, or fulfill 
this right. The author gives the example of the blatant breach of this principle in the 2005 WTO 
appellate finding that the USA hid more than US $3 billion in annual cotton subsidies and other 
supports. This substantially depressed world cotton market prices and adversely impacted poor 
cotton-farming households in places such as Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Benin to mention a 
few. 
 After the AoA implementation, the authors gave us a recipe on how WTO's recent 
negotiations responded to the concerns of the right-to-food in the Global South. The authors 
describe a complicated situation between the Doha Round and Cancun. The first phase of the 
negotiations highlighted a range of concerns about AoA’s impact on the capacity of a state to 
guarantee the right to food. Developing countries emphasized on protecting and enhancing their 
domestic food-production capacity, an end to the blue box, reform of the green box, proposal to 
stop the SSG, and create an SSM (special safeguard mechanism), a food security box calling for 
flexibility for developing countries, etc… EU and USA in particular rejected the Global South 
demands and produced a join narrative that proposed a scenario in favor of an increase in trade-
distorting supported under the AMS, tariff reductions, EU maintain high tariffs for such 
important exports to developing country as sugar and dairy based products, as seen in chapter 2. 
After the Uruguay Round, developing countries have strongly resisted being excluded. The 
authors underline that their alternative proposition recognized the responsibility of states to 
uphold the right to food. The image described by the authors is one of multiple disagreements 
between developed and developing countries, as well as a distinct fracture among developing 
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countries. The authors conclude that classical and neoclassical trade theories do not explain the 
outcomes of GATT and the WTO. He cites Luterbacher and Norrlof - "it cannot be taken for 
granted that the institutional reform represented by the creation of the WTO will guarantee a 
continued movement toward further liberalization of the world trade”77.  
The author argues that under this managed trade system, the AoA established a set of rules 
biased against developing countries, constraining the state from acting to respect, protect, and 
fulfill the right to food. While the AoA seeks to reduce agricultural barriers, it has produced 
protectionist exeptions for the benefit of the richest players in the global market, blatantly 
violating the right to food and grossly failing the principle and promise of free trade. The authors 
conclude that the AoA shows that global markets in agriculture are not only gravely skewed but 
are intensely distorted to meet the interests of those with power.  
 
To conclude comment on this article, we can say that the authors give a unique perspective 
on the WTO AoA rules and its recent deadlock in the Doha Round. The normative aspect of the 
right to food perspective helps us evaluate the neoclassic argument that support free trade in 
agriculture with no government intervention. It also helps us realize that the AoA is far from 
being what it claims to be “a free trade agreement”, but rather constitutes diverse mechanisms 
that advantage developed country subsidized agricultural leverage. In addition, the focus on 
liberalization does not help to address the crucial agricultural issues for LDCs, such as ensuring 
greater food security and self-sufficiency. At a bare minimum the negotiations must provide the 
least developed with a means to protect, in the short term, their agricultural sectors in times of 
import shortages.  
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Without	  trying	  to	  take	  any	  side	  on	  whether	  or	  not	  liberalization	  of	  agriculture	  is	  better	  
than	  protectionism,	  one	  can	  make	  good	  use	  of	  those	  authors	  findings	  only	  to	  note	  that	  the	  
current	   agricultural	   agreement	   is	   just	   purely	   detrimental	   to	   developing	   countries	  
agricultural	   endeavors	   and	   their	   right	   to	   food.	   Therefore,	   the	   recent	   development	   of	   the	  
different	  AoA	  pillars	  at	  the	  DDA	  will	  most	  likely	  reflect	  the	  same	  conclusions.	  The	  fact	  that	  
free	   trade	   in	  agriculture	   is	   subject	   to	  debate	  on	  whether	  or	  not	   is	  beneficial	   for	  different	  
market	  is	  not	  the	  question.	  Here	  under	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  DDA	  the	  goal	  of	  any	  reform	  of	  
the	  AoA	  has	   aimed	   to	   rectify	   any	  biases	   that	   have	  been	   caused	  by	   the	  WTO	   institutional	  
framework.	   Instead,	   not	   only	   the	   reforms	  proposed	  do	  not	   change	   any	  of	   the	  bias	   of	   the	  
AoA	  but	  unfortunately	  takes	  away	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  particular	  matter	  that	  is	  agriculture.	  The	  
right-­‐to-­‐food	  perspective	  shows	  us	  that	  any	  reform	  on	  the	  AoA	  should	  rightfully	  bear	  the	  
normative	   aspect	   of	   the	   right-­‐to-­‐food.	   No	  matter	  which	   avenue,	   protectionism	  measures	  
versus	   liberalization	   measures,	   this	   is	   not	   the	   point;	   the	   key	   issue	   is	   that	   reforms	   on	  
agriculture	   taking	   place	   at	   DDA	   should	   at	   a	   bare	   minimum	   take	   in	   consideration	   the	  
obligations	  of	  respect,	  protect	  and	  fulfill	  that	  is	  the	  based	  of	  the	  right-­‐to-­‐food	  argument	  and	  
human	  right	  perspective	  for	  all	  the	  countries	  members,	  as	  a	  universal	  value.	  Not	  because	  a	  
human	  right	  perspective	  should	  not	  have	  its	  place	  inside	  a	  democratic	  organization,	  but	  on	  
the	  basic	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  ignorance	  and	  absence	  of	  such	  considerations	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  
the	  AoA	  is	  bias	  toward	  powerful	  countries	  produce	  even	  more	  asymmetrical	  outcomes	  to	  
the	   disadvantage	   of	   weaker	   countries	   and	   jeopardizes	   the	   credibility	   of	   the	  WTO	   as	   an	  
institution	   of	   multilateral	   collective	   gains.	   Some	   can	   ask	   the	   simple	   question	   why	   is	  
developed	   countries	   concerns	   about	   liberalization	   of	   agriculture	   harmful	   repercussions	  
more	   important	   that	   consideration	   of	   how	   harmful	   and	   detrimental	   protectionism	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measures	   are	   to	   developing	   countries	   farmers?	   The	   continual	   appraisal	   of	   protectionism	  
measures	  from	  the	  WTO	  organization	  is	  a	  reminder	  of	  how	  the	  interest	  of	  powerful	  states	  
continues	   to	   be	   more	   relevant.	   However	   this	   failure	   of	   the	   DDA	   to	   repossess	   the	   true	  
essence	  of	  trade	  liberalization	  in	  a	  sector	  where	  trade-­‐distorting	  farm	  subsidies	  have	  been	  
“universally	  recognized	  as	  intolerable”78	  is	  putting	  the	  future	  of	  trade	  liberalization	  and	  the	  
WTO	  in	  jeopardy.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Sungjoon Cho, “The demise of the development in the Doha Round Negociations” Texas 
International Law Journal, (2009), p 582 
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Chapter 4 : Brazil’s Case Against the U.S. Cotton and its 
Implications. 
 
In this Chapter we are looking at Brazil’s dispute settlement case at the DSB, (WTO's dispute 
settlement body), against specific provisions of the U.S. cotton program in 2002. We are 
analyzing its significance for the advancement of the cotton issue at the DDA and in general, as 
well as its implication for other developing countries. 
 
I/WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)  
 The dispute claims 
Focusing on six specific claims relating to US payment programs, Brazil argued that the US 
had failed in its commitments to the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) and the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). Brazil had begun a dispute 
settlement case at the DSB, WTO's dispute settlement body, against specific provisions of the 
U.S. cotton program in 2002. By September 8, 2004, the DSB panel ruled against the United 
States on multiple crucial issues. Partly in response to the March 2005 upheld appeal, the United 
States has made few modifications to its cotton programs. However, in August 2006, Brazil 
asked for a review of whether or not the United States had fully complied. By December 2007, 
the compliance panel determined that the United States had indeed not fully complied with 
earlier WTO recommendations. Let us explore the main points where Brazil hinges her claims of 
violation on.  
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The first claim is the Peace Clause Violation. Brazil argues that the United States was no 
longer exempt from WTO dispute proceedings under the so-called “peace clause” (Article 13) of 
the WTO’s AoA because U.S. domestic and export subsidies to its cotton sector were had 
surpassed the benchmark level. “Prior to its expiry in January of 2004, Article 13 exempted 
domestic support measures that complied with the AA’s requirements from being challenged as 
illegal subsidies through dispute settlement proceedings, as long as the level of support for a 
commodity remained at or below the benchmark 1992 marketing year (MY) levels”79. Brazil 
claimed that the United States was no longer in compliance with those requirements and 
therefore should stop being under the protection of WTO’s peace clause rule; demonstrating that 
U.S. cotton subsidies were about $2 billion in may 1992 compared with over $4 billion by may 
201180. The second important point of Brazil’s dispute case was that they needed to prove that 
U.S. subsidies had caused them “Serious Prejudice”. Brazil contended that domestic farm 
subsidies provided to U.S. cotton farmers provoked an overproduction and intensification in U.S. 
cotton exports, especially between 1999-2002, when unusually large outlays were made under 
provisions of the U.S. cotton program. Brazil alleged that the increase in U.S. exports 
contributed to three market conditions, each of which inflicted to grave injury to Brazilian cotton 
exporters. Those three markets condition are: 
 
(1) An increase in the U.S. share of the world upland cotton market. (Figure 1) 
(2) A displacement of Brazilian upland cotton sales in third-country markets. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Brazil’s WTO Case Against the U.S. Cotton Program Randy Schnepf, Specialist in 
Agricultural Policy June 30, 2010, p 5 
80 Brazil’s WTO Case Against the U.S. Cotton Program Randy Schnepf, Specialist in 
Agricultural Policy June 30, 2010, p 5 
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(3) A steep decline in world cotton prices (see Figure 2 and Figure 3).81 
 
In addition, Brazil reported that injury to its economy was over $600 million just for the year 
2001. They account for it based on low cotton prices, “measured as the sum of individual 
negative impacts on income, foreign trade revenue, fiscal revenues, related services 
(transportation and ginning), and employment”82. Brazil insisted that injuries under each of these 
three categories were in violation of the SCM Agreement, and would even be worst in future 
years.  
 










	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Brazil’s WTO Case Against the U.S. Cotton Program Randy Schnepf, Specialist in 
Agricultural Policy June 30, 2010, p 9 
82 Brazil’s WTO Case Against the U.S. Cotton Program Randy Schnepf, Specialist in  
Agricultural Policy June 30, 2010, p 9 
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Figure 2: USDA Cotton Support, 1192 to 2010 
 
Figure 3: USDA Support, 1992 to 2010 
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 Sanction and Cross- Retaliation: the innovative demands 
According to an article by Julian Ku (2010) Brazilian president Lula said during the 
inauguration of a power plant in near Sao Paulo, “Brazil is not interested in confrontation. We’re 
interested in respect for the decisions of the WTO. Either we respect institutions or the world 
will fall into disarray”.83 On March 3, 2009, at a meeting of the DSB in Geneva, Brazil 
demanded the right to impose $2.5 billion in retaliatory sanctions against the United States. 
Brazil’s proposed sanctions can be classify in three sections:  
 
1. A one-time countermeasure of $300 million related to the U.S. Step 2 program, 
2. An annual countermeasure of $1.2 billion based on the prohibited subsidies ruling concerning 
the U.S. export credit guarantee program, and  
3. An annual countermeasure of $1 billion based on the actionable subsidies ruling concerning 
price-contingent programs (e.g., the counter-cyclical and marketing loan programs).84  
 
For the first time in trade history, as part of the violation sanction against the U.S, Brazil 
is seeking “cross-retaliation” rights that would permit retaliation in sector other than just tradable 
goods, such as intellectual property rights and services agreements. Not surprisingly, the U.S has 
strongly disagreed with both the amount of the countermeasure demanded, as well as with any 
“cross-retaliation” procedures. According to Lawrence, a professor of international trade and 
finance at the Harvard Kennedy School, retaliation in trade has been exclusive to the powerful 
developed countries, the ones with market power. However this mechanism of potential cross-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Julian Ku. “Brazil Gets Ready to Punish the U.S. for Violating International Law” 
March 11th, 2010 
84 Randy Schnepf, “Brazil’s WTO Case Against the U.S. Cotton Program”, Congressional 
Research Service, June 2010.	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retaliation of suspending intellectual property protection, gives weaker developing countries a 
way to enforce their rights under trade rules.85After an arbitration panel (established in October 
2008) reviewing countermeasure proposals, the U.S and Brazil ultimately reached an agreement 
in 2010.The announcement came one day before Brazil was allowed to impose up to $830 
million in sanctions. The arbitration panel had ruled that American subsidies to cotton farmers 
had violated global trade rules86. One major implication of the ruling and the dispute case in 
general is that it highlighted the fact that US and European Union have used loopholes and 
creative accounting , or to call it bluntly-cheating, to continue dumping products on developing 
markets, hurting impoverished developing country farmers in the process. As an example for this 
specific case of Brazil’s against U.S, the WTO dispute settlement panel found that the USA 
misreported certain programs as ‘non trade-distorting’, when in fact they were trade-distorting. 
In addition, there is a certain uncertainty when it comes to the Doha Round, where a successful 
conclusion of the round would most likely terminate Brazil’s interest in continuing its case 
against the U.S. farm programs. On the other hand depending on the modalities of the final draft 
at DDA, The American Congress must keep an eye on the aftermath of the compliance panel’s 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Sewell Chan, “U.S. and Brazil Reach Agreement on Cotton Dispute”, Cambridge Journals 
Online, April 7, 2010.  
86 Sewell Chan, “U.S. and Brazil Reach Agreement on Cotton Dispute”, Cambridge Journals 
Online, April 7, 2010. 
87 Randy Schnepf, “Brazil’s WTO Case Against the U.S. Cotton Program”, Specialist in 
Agricultural Policy June 30, 2010, p 33 
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II/ The dispute Implications: perspective for LDC and the DDA scenarios 
	  
While addressing the cotton subsidies issue through the Doha negotiations, other 
countries, based on the success of Brazil’s dispute case have considered challenging trade 
distortions through the DSB. Cotton represent an important part of LDC share of export 
quantities and is one of the rarely product that they have a comparable advantage, as seen in 
figure 4. The dispute between Brazil and the U.S has led to significant jurisprudence’s 
developments on subsidies globally at the WTO. It also and more importantly provoked findings 
about the illegality of multiple US cotton subsidies under existing AoA rules. 
Despite successive DSB rulings against certain aspects of US cotton subsidies, Washington has 
yet to bring cotton payments into conformity with WTO obligations. At the same time, unilateral 
domestic policy reforms in the EU and US have limited if any impact on world cotton markets. 
The 2003-04 reform of the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and subsequent amendments 
changed the guaranteed minimum price for cotton to a mix of coupled and allegedly decoupled 
payments. In the US, the 2008 Farm Bill kept cotton subsidies largely unchanged and indicated 
an unwillingness to comply with the DSB panel rulings or the mandates of the Hong Kong 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Mário Jales, “How Would A Trade Deal On Cotton Affect Exporting And Importing 
Countries?”, Cornell University, p 6 
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Figure 4: Shares of World Export Quantities, By Porduct and Country Category, 2003-2007 
 
 
A study, commissioned by the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development and conducted by Mario Jales of Cornell University, suggests that cotton prices 
would have increased over a 1998-2007 base period if the US had cut subsidies that were 
considered unlawful by the dispute panel at the WTO, following complaints by Brazil, (see 
figure 5). According to Jales, farmers in weak countries could have gained from an average 6 
percent increase in world cotton prices over the same base period if the US had accepted 
proposals made by African nations to cut the lavish subsidies to rich country producers.89 In the 
same report, we learn that cotton production in the US could have decreased by as much as 15 
percent, if African proposals in the draft Doha accord were applied to historical output levels 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Mário Jales, “How Would A Trade Deal On Cotton Affect Exporting And Importing 
Countries?”, Cornell University, p 6	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over the ten-year period examined by the study, and production in the EU could have dropped by 
as much as 30 percent, with production volumes estimated to increase as much as 3-3.5 percent 
in Brazil, Central Asia and West Africa and production values growing by up to 13 
percent.90.Similarly, if African proposals that are included in the Doha draft were applied to trade 
flows over the ten-year period that the study examines, US export volumes would have fallen by 
16 percent on average. Average export volumes would have increased dramatically for Brazil 
and India (12-14 percent), and by a lower but still substantial amount in Uzbekistan, the ‘C-4′ 
West African cotton producing countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali), and Australia 
(2-2.5 percent)91. 
Figure 5: Estimated Impact of Alternative Scenarios on the Cotton World Price, 1998-2007 
(bar indicates average; vertical line indicates range)
 
1. A:  December 2008 Revised Draft Modalities 
2. B:  Cotton treated as a standard product 
3. C:  Hypothetical full implementation of DSB recommendations 
4. D:  Actual insufficient implementation of DSB recommendations 
5. E:  Recent internal reforms in the US and EU 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 The International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, “Cotton: What could a Doha 
deal mean for trade?” number 11. November 2010, p 15 
91 The International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, “Cotton: What could a Doha 
deal mean for trade?” number 11. November 2010, p 16 
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The first scenario in figure 5 and 6, (scenario A) showed the largest increases in world prices, 
with Scenarios B and C following. Scenario D and E have negligible price. The results of this 
table portray substantial variation on a year-by-year basis. Figure 6 illustrates these results over 
the range of the years studied (1998-2007). Implementing the draft Doha agriculture deal with 
treating cotton as a special provisions had the most effect on increasing world price, in individual 
years and when measuring the average across all years. This potential gains from scenario A 
reinforces the argument of the Cotton four to urge the treatment of cotton as a separated issue.  
 




The WTO DDA could have a significant positive impact on world cotton prices and 
provide the expansion of cotton production and exports in developing countries. However, the 
likelihood of such an outcome is highly correlated with the likehood of subsidy reductions being 
adopted by WTO members. The lack of internal policy reforms in key subsidizing countries and 
the frustrated lack of US compliance with DSB recommendations in the US Upland Cotton 
dispute highlight the importance of multilateral trade negotiations in addressing the deep 
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distortions that characterize the world cotton market. When dealing with the cotton issue, 
subsidies should be focus of the negotiations. There is a crucial need to reform existing trade 
rules that concede developed countries to highly subsidize domestic production, depress world 
prices, drive farmers elsewhere out of production and harm prospects for economic advancement 
for developing countries. The adoption of ambitious domestic support reforms for cotton in the 
Doha Round would be a significant step towards the establishment of a fair and market-oriented 
trading system92.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Mário Jales, “How Would A Trade Deal On Cotton Affect Exporting And Importing 
Countries?”, Cornell University, p17. 
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Findings and Concluding Discussion 
 
Keohane, and game theorists give compelling arguments to explain how cooperation is 
not only possible but rational in an anarchic world of egoists. The multiple incentives created by 
the WTO have historically been working in favor of cooperation for members’ countries, and to 
balance out the other world of hegemonic power-seeking countries as described by realists. 
However, we argue that institutional incentives such as the DSB retaliation mechanisms are only 
applicable when countries have signed and are under legal obligations. As seen in the arena of 
bargaining negotiations that constitute the DDA, its initial objective to rectify some of the AoA 
pillars to overall increase developmental perspective for developing countries has not only failed 
but represent an organized hypocrisy. The final deal will barely resemble what was envisaged in 
the original mandate. The commitment of the WTO to engage in a new phase of negotiation to 
rebalance some of the asymmetrical outcomes caused by previous agreements such as the AOA 
is simply and purely a façade. Interests of powerful developed countries have slowly taken the 
front row in the latest Doha. Fusing together the insights of economic models on the predicted 
outcome of the DDA with a qualitative analysis of the pattern of the negotiation’s progress, we 
see that the likely gains for weak countries from the Doha Round are both small and deeply 
problematic. The inclusion of fast growing countries such as India and Brazil in the powerful 
table of negotiation is symptomatic with the strategy of carrot and stick93 describe by critical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Richard H. Steinberg, “In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus- Based Bargaining and 
Outcomes in the GATT/ WTO”, International Organization Volume 56, Issue 02, (March 2002), 
pp 339 -374. 
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theorist. Including a few countries in the FIP doesn’t make the WTO more inclusive; it actually 
creates a separation within the developing world’s solidarity where benefits envisaged by the 
DDA will only profit those new powerful club’s members. For the rest of developing world, 
especially for LDC the DDA will most likely leave them worse off. Moreover, it is symptomatic 
of the fact that to be taking into consideration and be heard at the WTO you need to be an 
important socioeconomic player.  
The realist’s perspective (the fact that negotiation at the WTO is power driven) opens the 
door for normative considerations to take the front row and deeply criticize internal procedures at 
the WTO. The concept of deliberative democracy helps us to question the roots of decision-
making mechanisms. Even though the institutional characteristic of the WTO is a one-of-a-kind 
example for international cooperation (multilateralism, dispute settlement unit), some crucial 
points, such as the fact that the WTO is producing non pareto-improving outcomes, or that 
members are excising some invisible weighting, are enough to put WTO under intense and 
methodical criticism. Some will question whether normative consideration on agriculture has its 
place in the agricultural liberalization debate. To this question, emphatically, I answer yes. The 
normative aspect of the right-to-food perspective not only helps us evaluate the neoclassical 
argument that supports free trade in agriculture with no government intervention, but it also 
helps us realize that the AoA is far from being what it claims to be, i.e., “a free trade agreement”. 
It rather constitutes a myriad of diverse protectionism mechanisms that work to the advantage of 
developed countries subsidized agricultural. Therefore what can we conclude? An organization 
that is promoting free trade but rather creating the opposite is an example of successful 
cooperation?  
The WTO place greater importance on keeping protectionism measures for developed 
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country than on addressing the extreme situation of food security and livelihoods for LDC. The 
reconciliation between agriculture as a special issue and that of the liberalization perspective 
should have been the goal of the AoA pillars reforms. At a bare minimum, the negotiations 
should have provided the least developed countries with a means to protect, in the short term, 
their agricultural sectors in times of import shortages, and not only ensure the protection of rich 
countries’ farmers. Without trying to take any side on whether or not liberalization of agriculture 
is better than protectionism, one can make good use of normative arguments in so far as to note 
that the current agricultural agreement is egregiously and purely biased and certainly detrimental 
to developing countries' agricultural endeavors and their right-to-food. We found that, the recent 
development of the different AoA pillars at the DDA, will most likely reflect the same 
conclusions. No matter which avenue, protectionism measures versus liberalization measures, 
this is not the point; the key issue is that reforms on agriculture taking place at DDA should at a 
bare minimum take into consideration the basis of the right-to-food argument has a human right 
issue. Not because a human right perspective should not have its place inside a democratic 
organization, but on the basis of the fact that the ignorance and absence of such considerations, 
and the fact that the AoA has repeatedly and historically shown bias toward powerful countries, 
have produced even more asymmetrical outcomes to the disadvantage of weaker developing 
countries and have jeopardized the credibility of the WTO as an institution of multilateral 
collective gains. 
Do powerful western countries overwhelm any perspective gains for the South? Does the 
nature of the WTO as a forum for trade liberalization offer enough to close a deal on the DDA? 
Those questions even though legitimate are not new to WTO critics as a multilateral institution 
creating asymmetric outcomes. However in the light of the DDA’s failure as a developmental 
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round, we can seriously question the future of the WTO. Were the WTO to attempt any future 
new round of negotiation, would future negatives outcomes for farmers in developing countries 
leads to public outrage and new debacles such as the 1999 “Battle in Seattle” and provoke the 
WTO to take action? The case study of Brazil’s dispute against the U.S. reflects positive 
incentives from the DSB and reassesses the power of the WTO as a retaliation type of 
organization. However, can we conclude that it is enough? After looking at the potential 
implications of the disputed case for LDC we can assert a negative answer. The cotton case 
perfectly illustrates the influence of power politics at the WTO. How the U.S goliath (and EU to 
a certain extent) successfully cheated the AoA rules to keep on subsiding cotton growers, and 
practically walked off free, is mind-boggling. We found that the DDA negotiations failed to 
address cotton expeditiously and efficiently. At this point of time, DDA or not, the fact that 
developmental goals are seriously diminished or nonexistent, that the possible opportunities for 
agricultural benefits only concern a few developing country (China, Brazil, India) - leaving LDC 
out of potential gains - and given the fact that power politics in the realists sense have more 
likely played a more significant role in the shaping of the latest draft of DDA, one can conclude 
that the once neoliberal case study excellence in term of cooperation and collective gains theory 
is more than exposing itself and showing shortcomings that reflect more pessimistic outcomes. 
Throughout the years of negotiation, the alliance of the developing countries gives more 
symbolic than substantive results. After conceding crucial issues, the interests of the powerful 
states seemed more represented in the final draft of the Round and the balance of power seems to 
have shifted away from the LDCs. 
We can say that the conclusion of the Round does not matter in as far as transparency and 
fairness in development is concerned because, based on the 2008 draft, we already know that  the 
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developmental perspective for weaker countries is null or insignificant. Further research needs to 
look at the final cotton deal, the AoA pillars final changes to evaluate precisely the omissions 
and missed opportunities with respect to the initial talks. Lastly the conclusion of a deal at the 
DDA is everything except a sign of success for the WTO as an organization. If weaker countries 
repeatedly sign agreements that are in their disfavor, we can draw two conclusions. First, it gives 
significance to the classical realists' argument, that is the capacity of powerful states to 
systematically influence weaker states to sign agreement at their disadvantage. Secondly, it gives 
further fuel to the point that the WTO organization is in need of institutional reforms. For how 
long would it be able to sustain asymmetrical negotiations without having another effort from 
developing world new alliance to try to stand against the developed countries? Or how long 
before consideration of justice take over the organization? The trouble of the DDA reflects 
deeper considerations that question the WTO’s identity. The apparent disorder of twelve years of 
unfruitful negotiation conducting to no developmental prospect for the LDC illustrates an 
organized hypocrisy. Classical theorist such as Morgenthau and Thucydides would believe that 
the apparent troubles of the WTO are symptomatic of a crisis in its value, identities and norms. 
Therefore it will be beneficial for the WTO to return to its original mission by restructuring, 
redefining, and reshaping its core values, norms and identities on an enduring basis. 
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